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ABSTRACT 
The policy-making component of representation in the U.S. and 
Great Britain has been closely studied and compared, but the 
constituency's component�the handling of constituent complaints and 
the protection of constituency iilterests�is less well understood. 
This paper considers two questions about the constituency component of 
representation: how much and what kinds of casework services d,o MPs 
as opposed to Congressmen provide, and secondly, what are the 
statistical determinants of these activities? With regard to the 
first question, our findings indicate that MPs devote more of their 
own time and resources to constituency work than do Congressmen. In 
addition, we identify representatives on both sides of the Atlantic 
who adopt a more aggressive strategy towards their constituency work. 
This strategy is manifested by such activities as publicizing 
successful cases, handling cases which concern local government 
matters, the frequency of surgeries and the active solicitation of 
cases. In the second part of this paper, we model these activities as 
being related to the electoral margin, party and the year the 
representative was elected. These estimations indicate that casework 
entrepreneurs in both countries are most likely to be in marginal 
seats, recently elected and Democrats or Labour. 
CASEWORK SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina 
The policy-making component of representation in the U.S. and 
Great Britain has been closely studied and compared, but the 
constituency component-the handling of constituent complaints and the 
protection of constituency interests-is less well understood. While 
knowledge about this aspect of Congressional representation is growing 
(Fenno, 1978; Fiorina, 1977; Mayhew, 1 974; Macartney, 1 975; Cranor and 
Westphal, 1978; Parker, 1979a, 1979b; Frantzich, 1979; Johannes, 1978; 
Yiannakis, 1979; Mezy, 1976), there has been relatively less attention 
to constituency representation in Great Britain (Dowse, 1963; Barker 
and Rush, 1967; King, 1974a, 1 974b) and practically no theoretical or 
empirical work comparing constituency work across the two systems 
(Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1979a, 1979b). 
Why has constituency service in the British system received 
comparatively less attention? Primarily, it is because the 
conventional account of British politics does not attribute much 
significance to this aspect of the MPs job. In part, this skepticism 
is founded on the widespread belief that observable differences in the 
constituency effort of MPs are personal and idiosyncratic. R. E. 
Dowse in his study of MPs and their surgeries, for instance, found no 
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relation between electoral margin and the frequency of surgeries and 
concluded that holding surgeries seems to stem from the "genuine 
desire to win public esteem and to be of service" (Dowse, 1963, 336). 
Others maintain that institutional differences are so great 
that constituency work in Great Britain and the United States are very 
different phenomena. 'While American CongresS111en might hope to win 
votes by faithfully attending to their dist��cts' interests, British 
MPs cannot expect to be rewarded for their efforts due to the strength 
of national forces in Great Britain (Mayhew, 1974; Stokes, 1975). 
Nonetheless there are reasons to think that a comparison of 
constituency activities in Great Britain and the United States might 
be meaningful. To begin with, decisions about how to allocate scarce 
time and resources (including staff tasks) should be important to 
representatives in both countries. Time devoted to constituency 
affairs is costly in the sense that it is time which could have been 
spent on other private or public matters. ! Moreover, since these 
decisions have high opportunity costs, there should be reasons for why 
representatives do what they do. This implies systematic and 
potentially explicable patterns of behavior. 
It is possible, however, that institutional differences 
prevent meaningful comparisons of constituency work in the U.S. and 
in the U.K. MPs, for example, have neither the staffs nor the budgets 
that their American counterparts have to carry out their constituency 
work (Mayhew, 1974), and party ties are demonstrably stronger in Great 
Britain than in the U.S. (Butler and Stokes, 1969). There are several 
responses to these objections. First, since MPs and Congressmen alike 
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must run in single member districts, there is an incentive in both 
systems to do what one can to increase support in one's district. 
Secondly, although the absence of large staffs in Great Britain might 
restrict the scope of constituency work, for the same reason, 
constituency service decisions may be more important to the Member. 
The reasoning behind this is that when constituency work must be done 
with very little staff, the opportunity costs of a given level of 
effort will be higher. 
Institutional restrictions aside, are national forces in Great 
Britain so strong that constituency effort is meaningless? Not 
necessarily, for there is growing evidence that national forces have 
been in decline and the hitherto stable post war pattern of British 
politics may be changing: party identification with the Conservative 
and Labour parties has declined, regional variations have increased, 
class voting bas weakened, and various anomalies in the uniform 
national swing have been noted (Crewe, 1974, 1979). More to the 
point, our own studies have shown that MPs who engaged in high levels 
of constituency service achieved better swings in the May 1979 General 
Election than did other MPs (Cain, 1980). Thus, it appears that 
national forces in Britain can be modified by the actions of 
individual candidates. 
Finally, there is the consideration that the strength of the 
electoral incentive does not require that national forces be stronger 
than short term forces. Constituency work can be electorally 
beneficial even when the goal is restricted to winning votes at the 
margin: the greater the need to secure even a small margin of 
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security from adverse national swings, the greater the potential 
electoral gain from diligent constituency work. 
The distinction beween the objective and perceived values of 
constituency work is also important. The number of votes actually won 
by doing a lot of casework is a separate question from what 
representatives think they can win. The Congressman's or MP's 
estimate of the objective value of casework will often be uncertain. 
This uncertainty can lead to greater constituency effort if, being 
risk averse, representatives leave no stone unturned when it comes to 
protecting their careers. Elsewhere, we have considered the question 
of whether there is electoral benefit to constituency work (Cain, 
Ferejohn and Fiorina; 1979b). In this paper, we will consider whether 
this benefit accounts for the time and resources that MPs and 
Congressmen devote to their constituents. 
Specifically, there are two questions to consider. First, how 
much and what kinds of constituency services do MPs as opposed to 
Congressmen provide, and secondly, what are the statistical 
determinants of these activities? The U.S. data comes from a survey 
we conducted in the summer of 1978 of 1 02 Congressional offices based 
on the sample of the CPS 1978 Congressional Election Study.2 Our 
British sample is of 1 00 incumbent MPs and agents. It was collected 
in the summer following the 1979 General Election and is based on a 
sample of constituencies from our Gallup voter study.3 We tried to 
make the questions in both studies as comparable as possible while at 
the same time remaining sensitive to important differences in 
institutions and terminology. 
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COMPARING CONSTITUENCY ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. 
Constituency politics would matter little if it did not demand 
much of the representative's time and resources, so it is important to 
know bow much and what kinds of activities American Congressmen and 
British MPs undertake. The fact that casework is a particularll­
i.mportant activity for both MPs and Congressman is evident from the 
number of cases they handle per week. These figures, displayed in 
Table I, indicate that Congressmen and their staffs have somewhat 
larger caseloads than do MPs. Fewer Congressmen than MPs fall into 
the 0-20 category, and many more fall into the 81-1 00 and 1 00+ 
categories. Of course, taking into account the fact that MPs 
represent constituencies which are approximately 1/5 the size of 
Congressional districts, and that they do not have comparable staff 
support, the MP�s casework load is remarkably large. 
[ INSEB.T TABLE I HERE) 
Most MPs have one or two personal secretaries, and some are 
aided in their constituency work by the local party's agent. All 
secretaries perform the clerical work associated with casework such as 
typing letters (although a few MPs proudly answer all letters in their 
own handwriting) and taking phone calls, but some are given the power 
to handle cases without the Member's personal supervision. When 
questioned about the amount of autonomy their secretaries had in 
dealing with cases, quite a few (49 percent) insisted that they 
directly supervised each case and that their secretaries had no 
autonomy whatsoever. Another 36 percent said their secretaries 
<20 
21-40 
41-60 
61-80 
81-100 
lOo+ 
MV 
N 
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF CASES HANDLED PER WEEK 
Congressmen MP's 
9% 23% 
28% 23% 
18% 14% 
6% 10% 
14% 8% 
16% 3% 
10% 19% 
102 100 
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sometimes handled cases without their direct supervision, and only 1 0  
percent said that their secretaries frequently dealt with cases 
autonomously. 
The other source of professional staff support is the local 
party agent. The agent's normal tasks are to help maintain the 
organization of the local party and to assist in the running of 
constituency election campaigns. Some agents help their MPs by 
screening cases during the week and arranging appointments for the 
weekend surgery (i.e. the designated time during the weekend when the 
MP meets with constituents to hear their complaints). Agents of 
ministers tend to do more screening than do agents of backbenchers, 
but whether agents undertake such work of ten depends on their personal 
relationship with the MP since it is not a formal duty: they are 
employees of the party and not of the Member directly. Perhaps for 
this reason, agents have more autonomy in dealing with cases than do 
secretaries: 16 percent of the agents as opposed to 9 percent of the 
secretaries were given a great deal of autonomy. Still, over half (56 
percent) had little or no casework responsibility. 
The substantial personal involvement of the MP stands in sharp 
contrast to the approach of most Congressmen. When asked to estimate 
the amount of time the Congressman personally spent on casework, 47 
percent of our sample said that the Congressman rarely spent any time 
on casework, 18 percent said that the Congressman spent less than 10 
percent of his time on casework, and only 9 percent said that the 
Congressman spent more than 10 percent of his time on casework (the 
rest did not know). 
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One might conclude from this that far from being a choice of 
little consequence, the decision about how much time to allocate to 
constituency affairs is very important for the MP�perhaps, even more 
so than for the Congressman�since it can involve much personal time 
and effort. When Members were asked how much time they devoted to all 
constituency matters�including casework�only 5 percent said that 
they spent 10 percent or less of their time,and only another 3 percent 
said that they spent between 11 percent and 20 percent of their time 
on constituency affairs. Most of them indicated that constituency 
affairs took a substantial amount of their time: 26 percent said that 
they spent between 21 percent and 40 percent of their time and 38 
percent said that they spent beween 41 percent and 60 percent of their 
time on constituency work. An additional 10 percent declined to give 
us numerical estimates or day by day descriptions but indicated that 
they spent a great deal or most of their time working on constituency 
matters. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL CASEWORK ACTIVITIES 
Nursing the constituency in Great Britain is sometimes called 
"grassrooting" or "parish pump politics". The entrepreneurial 
attitude some MPs have adopted towards their constituency work is best 
summed up by a communication from Kenneth Lomas, a former Labour MP 
from Huddersfield West: 
To win, and hold my Constituency on four successive occasions 
meant 'Grass-Rooting' with a vengeance. Parliament took up four 
days a week, but the real work was done in the Constituency on 
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Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays. There was no such thing as a 
long, or short, Recess. Those precious days were used to help 
keep the Party machine working, in cheering on the troops, in 
perfecting the organization, and in making the news in my local 
paper at least four days a week. 
By involving myself into virtually every organization in 
the town I gathered potential votes around me, and persuaded even 
those who would cast their vote against me, not to go out and 
canvas against me. 
Lomas' "grassrooting• methods were calculated to achieve an explicitly 
electoral goal. How, one.might ask, do the •grassrooting• methods of 
MPs and Congressmen compare? 
One method of •grassrooting" is getting back to the 
constituency as frequently as possible. Being seen in the 
constituency at political and social functions contributes to the 
perception that the representative cares about his constituents and 
understands their problems. It also protects them against the charge 
of being aloof or not caring about their constituency. Judging from 
the responses in Table III MPs and Congressmen get back to their 
constituency quite often. The modal response in both countries was 
every weekend, although this was said more often in Great Britain than 
in the U.S. A higher percentage of MPs than Congressmen do return to 
their constituencies more than once a week, but most of these 
individuals live in or around London. While the smaller geographical 
area in Great Britain may partly account for these crossnational 
differences, one should bear in mind that trips to remote 
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constituencies in Great Britain can be long and time consuming. The 
important statistic is that over 80 percent of the U.S. Congressmen 
and 90 percent of the MPs get back to their contituencies at least 
twice a month. This suggests that representatives in both countries 
consider this to be very important. 
[INSERT TABLE II HERE] 
A second method of "grassrooting" is encouraging constituents 
to bring complaints and requests of all sorts to the representative or 
his staff. A certain number of cases will come to the MP or 
Congressman even if their services are not well advertised. 
Advertising will increase the caseload, and by so doing, increase the 
representative's contacts with individual citizens. As the 
representative handles more of his constituent's problems, he hopes 
that he will convert voters to support him, or at least, as Kenneth 
Loams put it, that he will persuade those 11who would cast their vote 
against me, not to go out and canvas against me.• In addition, 
advertising ombudsmen services in some general way contributes to the 
MP's or Congressman's reputation for being a good constituency man. 
Not all MPs and Congressmen advertise their casework services. 
In our sample, 15 percent of the Congressmen and 36 percent of the MPs 
did not solicit cases. Among those who did, there were some 
crossnational differences in the mode of solicitation. Congressmen 
overwhelmingly prefer to encourage cases through radio, T.V., 
newspapers and newsletters whereas many MPs use more personalized 
methods such as touring neighborhoods, picking up cases at political 
and social functions, getting referrals through local party activists, 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF VISITS BACK TO CONSTITUENCY 
< 1 per month 
1 per month 
every 3rd. week 
2 per month 
3 per month 
1 per week 
More than 1 per week 
Missing 
N 
Congressmen 
4% 
6% 
8% 
31% 
5% 
41% 
4% 
1% 
102 
Members 
2% 
3% 
5% 
12% 
14% 
53% 
11% 
100 
1 0  
[INSERT TABLE III HERE] 
and even, in some instances, knocking on doors to call on constituents 
individually. One plausible explanation for this difference is that 
the smaller size of British constituencies makes personal solicitation 
and word of mouth much more effective for the MP than it would be for 
most Congressmen. MPs also have less money to spend on mailings, and 
this factor is no doubt important too. 
Another component of an effective constituency strategy is 
getting publicity for constituency work. Almost all MPs and 
Congressmen try to get publicity for projects that benefit the 
constituency or some significant segment of it, but the 
entrepreneurial representative will extend credit claiming to 
successful individual cases as well. However, others feel that 
publicizing individual cases is unnecessary and wrong. Sixty-eight 
percent of the Congressmen and 50 percent of the MPs we sampled took 
this position while 27 percent of the Congressmen and 50 percent of 
the MPs publicized individual cases. 
Much has been said so far about the manner of handling cases, 
but little about the sorts of problems MPs and Congressmen deal with. 
Our surveys indicate that Congresswaen received many of cases 
concerning social services, military and veteran problems, immigration 
and the IRS. MPs received requests for assistance on a wide range of 
problems, but the most frequent were housing, social services, 
taxation, legal problems and planning decisions. Enterprising 
representatives will take on cases of all sorts, including those which 
have nothing to do with the national government, whereas others will 
TABLE III 
SOLICITATION OF CASES 
Solicits Individual Cases 
Does not Solicit Individual 
Cases 
M.V. 
U.S. 
85% 
15% 
0 
PUBLICIZING SUCCESSFUL CASES 
Publicizes Successful 
Casework 
Does not Publicize 
Successful Casework 
M.V. 
U.S. 
27% 
67% 
6% 
HANDLING OF LOCAL (OR STATE) CASES 
Handles Local (or 
State) Cases 
Never Handles Local 
(or State) Cases 
M.V. 
U.S. 
42% 
53% 
5 
Local Cases are proper 
responsibility 
Handles reluctantly 
Does not Handle Local 
Cases 
U.K. 
64% 
36% 
0 
U.K. 
50% 
50% 
0 
U.K. 
50% 
33% 
17% 
0 
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carefully observe the boundaries of what they consider to be their 
national responsibilities. For example, housing in Great Britain 
falls within the jurisdiction of the local borough council and not the 
national government. Complaints about the waiting list for council 
homes or about the lack of repairs in council homes should really be 
referred to the local housing officer in the first instance, and then 
to the local councillor. In fact, many cons,tituents will take their 
housing complaints directly to the MP, hoping that the MP's greater 
influence will increase their chances of a successful resolution. 
Some MPs discourage housing cases and routinely refer them to local 
concillors while others handle some proportion or even all of the 
housing cases that come to them. As Table III indicates, British MPs 
on the whole are somewhat less likely to observe local versus national 
distinctions than their CoDgressional counterparts. Whereas 54 
percent of the CoDgressmen regularly referred state or local cases on 
to the appropriate state or local authority, only 17 percent of the 
MPs indicated that they would not handle local authority cases. 
One peculiarly British institution deserves mention before 
turning to other matters: namely, the surgery. The surgery--so named 
because it resembles a doctor's office hours�is an opportunity for 
citizens to meet with the MP to discuss their problems and complaints. 
Surgeries have been used in the past as a rough indicator of the 
degree of an MPs constituency effort, but there are reasons to be 
suspicious of this measure by itself. MPs in rural constituencies 
maintain that surgeries are more useful in densely populated areas 
than in geographically dispersed areas, where it is not as easy for 
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constituents to get a designated location. A rural MP may be just as 
dedicated (as an urban MP) to his constituents but hold fewer 
surgeries. Bearing this in mind, we tried to determine how frequently 
MPs held surgeries. Only 9 percent of our sample said that they held
no or infrequent surgeries. Eighty-nine percent of the sample held 
surgeries every month at least and 58 percent said that they held them 
every two weeks or more. This is further evidence of the heavy 
constituency involvement of MPs. 
[INSERT TABLE IV HERE] 
Switching from behavior to attitudes, we asked our respondents 
to evaluate the importance of casework as compared to other aspects of 
their job. Over 70 percent in both countries said that casework was a 
very high�or even the highest�priority, and less than 5 percent said
that it was not important at all. A significant number of MPs fell 
into the middle category of saying that while casework was important, 
it was less important than their duties on the floor and in 
collllllittees. Various reasons were cited to justify the importance of 
casework, but MPs were most likely to say things such as it helped 
them keep in touch with their constituents, it gave them personal 
satisfaction and it was an important duty of being an MP. The A.A.s 
could only tell us what they thought the Congressmen believed and many 
could not do that (63 percent). However, those who could gave reasons 
which were not al l that dissimilar from what the British MPs had said; 
namely, personal satisfaction, the Congressman's duty, keeping in 
touch with constituents and the like. 
None 
Ad hoc basis 
2 or 3 per year 
Every other month 
4% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
TABLE IV 
SURGERIES 
Every Month 
Every 3 weeks 
2 per month 
3 per month 
Every Week or more 
25% 
6% 
32% 
11% 
15% 
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Asked about the potential benefits of casework, over 80 
percent of both samples said that casework had definite electoral 
benefits. Only 2 percent of the British sample and 6 percent of the 
U.S. sample said that casework had no electoral payoff. Host MPs were 
quite realistic about what they could hope to gain by their efforts in 
the constituency even though many were uncertain about exactly how 
great the electoral benefit would be. Usually, they would refer to 
the conventional wisdom that being a good constituency man meant one 
or two percentage points or tell us about their experiences in 
previous elections. 
MODELING ENTB.EPRENEUB.IAL ACTIVITIES 
Our examination of how much and what kinds of activities MPs 
as opposed to Congressmen undertake in their constituencies has shown 
that MPs actually invest a considerable amount of time and effort into 
their constituency work, even by American standards. We will now turn 
to the question of whether the factors influencing constituency effort 
are really so different in Great Britain and the U.S.? To do this, ye 
need to identify the casework entrepreneurs and their motives. One 
plausible hypothesis is that the incentive to adopt an aggressive 
constituency style will depend on the Congressmen's or MP's electoral 
margin. Those in marginal seats should feel more insecure about their 
position and therefore have a greater need to do what they can to make 
it safer. Conversely, those in safe as opposed to marginal seats 
should value the electoral benefits of constituency work less and the 
opportunity costs more. It is, of course, possible that the 
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incumbent'& perception of closeness might not perfectly correspond 
with actual circumstances,but it is reasonable to assume that more 
individuals in seats with small as opposed to large majorities will 
believe their seats marginal. The idea then is that Congressmen and 
MPs have expectations about the closeness of the upcoming race which 
are based on the result of the previous election. Those who won close 
races in the last election will be more likely to view their seats as 
unsafe and undertake measures to consolidate their positions. 
A second variable in this model controls for the year in which 
the incumbent was first elected to the seat. There are two 
interpretations which can be given to this variable. The first is 
that it measures some cohort effect such as a shift in the behavioral 
patterns of Congressmen and MPs elected after a certain date: for 
instance, it is possible that Congressmen elected after 1964 or MPs 
elected after 1970 have adopted more aggressive constituency 
strategies than their predecessors. Alternatively, this variable may 
measure a life cycle phenomenon in the sense that the need to 
establish oneself in the seat may always be greater among the newly 
elected in every cohort group. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish 
between these interpretations with our cross-sectional data and must 
leave the issue unresolved for the present. 
The third variable is the Congressman's or MP's party. Party 
differences can be caused by ideological differences: for instance, 
Conservative MPs or Republican Congressmen may be less inclined to 
help their constituents take advantage of the welfare state than 
Labour MPs or Democratic Congressmen. Alternatively, the_ natural 
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constituencies of the left and the right may place different demands 
upon their representatives: working class individual& may need 
Clm.bud&man services more than middle class individuals. Either or both 
of these phenomena would lead us to expect that casework entrepreneurs 
were more likely to be Democrats or Labourites than Republicans or 
Conservatives. 
The model then can be summarized as follows: 
Y • a + B1Kt-l + BiP + B3E + u 
where Y • casework activities 
Mt- 1 • lagged marginality 
P • party (Conservative or Republicans) 
E = year incumbent elected to seat. 
The casework activities to be explained with the U.S. data are whether 
an effort was made to publicize successful casework in the media or 
newsletters, whether state or local cases were handled by the 
Congressman's staff or referred to state or local agencies and 
legislators, whether an effort was made to solicit more casework from 
constituents, and how much attention the Congressman devoted 
personally to casework. The ordinal nature of these variables calls 
for the use of a probit procedure.4 
The results of the U.S. estimations are displayed in Table v. 
The top row of the table lists the four dependent variables and the 
column to the left the independent variables and the relevant 
statistics. As a general observation, lagged marginality seems to be 
the best predictor in the sense of having statistically signficant and 
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properly signed coefficient&. By contrast, party does not predict 
well in any equation and has the wrong sign in one. Overall, the 
model works best for the solicitation of cases and personal attention 
variables. Congressmen in close seats are more likely to solicit 
casework and personally involve themselves in casework than those in 
safe seats. This is what was expected. The coefficients on the year 
elected variables do not conform as neatly �o expectations. Although 
recently elected Congressmen are more likely to solicit cases, they do 
not devote more personal attention to casework. Indeed, the opposite 
appears to hold; namely, the longer the years of service, the more 
likely it is that the Congressman will be personally involved in 
casework. Perhaps, this indicates a heavier reliance on staff by the 
newer members of Congress. 
[ INSERT ?ABLE V HEB.E] 
Judging from the size of the standard errors, party 
differences do not seem to matter much in determining casework 
practices. Nonetheless, it is interesting that Republicans are 
generally less likely to pursue aggressive constituency strategies 
than Democrats (with the possible exception of solicitation of cases). 
The handling of local cases and the publicity equations fare 
less well than the other two. The estimated R2 are extremely low and 
almost none of the coefficients are significant. The lone exception is 
lagged marginality, and it does have the predicted negative sign. 
However, marginality is not significant in the publicity equation, and 
a likely reason for this is that some Congressional offices regard the 
publication of a successful case as exploitative and a violation of 
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the citizen's privacy. The signs of the other coefficients indicate 
that Democrats are somewhat more likely than Republicans to publicize 
casework and handle local cases, and that newly elected Congressmen 
handle fewer local cases, but are more likely to publicize successful 
results. 
While this model seems to predict the casework practices of 
Congressional offices well, it predicts Couaressioual resource 
allocations better. In Table VI, the same model is applied to four 
new dependent variables: the number of the Congressional staff in the 
district office, the number of district offices, the number of 
caseworkers on the staff and the ratio of district to Washington 
staff. The first and fourth variables are obviously highly related, 
but since Congressmen do not always use their full allotment, they are 
not identical. Since these are cardinal variables, we can apply simple 
OLS techniques. As before, the dependent variables in Table VI are 
listed across the top and the independent variables down the column. 
For the most part, the results in these equations are consistent with 
those in the previous equations. The major differences are that there 
are fewer sign reversals and more statistically significant 
coefficients. The model best fits the district staff and the closely 
related ratio of district to Washington staff equations. In both 
cases, all the coefficients are statistically significant and properly 
signed: those in marginal seats, the recently elected and the 
Democrats are more likely to have larger district staffs and a higher 
district to Washington to staff ratio. The model also fits the 
caseworker equation well. By contrast, the district offices equation 
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is less successful. Neither the year elected nor the party variable 
coefficients are significant and the sign in the latter instance is TABLE VI 
not what we predicted. RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS OF STAFF AND OFFICES -- U.S. 
District District District Staff/ 
Staff Of fices Caseworkers Washington Staff 
[INSERT TABLE VI HEB.E] 
What in SU111111ary do the U.S. equations tell us. They seE!!ll to 
Margin in 
indicate that the newly elected, those in marginal seats and Democrats 1976 -.049* -.005 -.034* -.006* 
(. 017) (. 007) 
allocate more resources to constituency service and are more likely to 
(.Op) ( .003) 
Party 1.82* -.076 1.32 * .32* 
engage in various casework activities. At the same time, we noted (.48) (.206) ( .37) ( .09) 
that the model fits the resource allocation variables somewhat better Yr. elected .082* .047* .048t .013* 
( .034) (.014) (.027) (. 006) 
than it does casework activities. Indeed, separating the personal 
Constant 2.63 -.90 2.49 .08 
R2 .22 .13 .17 .16 
attention variable from the other three, we can make the following 
observation: namely, the model seems to apply better to decisions 
n 102 102 102 102 
made by the Congressman personally than it does to the the choice of 
Procedure OLS 
casework practices, which may partly reflect the organizational and 
personal biases of the staff. Whether to be involved in casework and 
* p < 
• 
05 ( t-test) 
how to use the Congressional allotment are presumably decisions 
t p < .10 
Congressmen make for themselves and should therefore directly reflect 
their motives and circumstances. The procedures which have evolved 
for the day to day handling of cases on the other hand may reflect 
these interests somewhat less clearly. 
The electoral incentive is evident in the American data, but 
is it evident in the British data as well? Parliamentary staff 
allocations cannot be analyzed in any meaningful way for the obvious 
reason that the limitations on staff are so severe that there is too 
little variation. However, we can model the casework activities of 
Members, and the four we will focus on are whether the MP solicits 
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additional casework, whether the Member publicizes successful cases 
for credit claiming purposes, whether the Member handles local cases 
or refers them to local officers and councillors, and whether the 
Member bolds surgeries more than twice per month. The estimation 
procedure is n-chotomous probit as before. 
The results of these estimations are given in Table VII. The 
first thing to notice is that the model fits the British data as well, 
and perhaps slightly better, than the U. S. data: party differences 
are more important and the sign of the year elected variable is always 
positive. The estimated a2 are somewhat higher and the overall chi 
squareds do not fail in any instance. Marginality is no less 
important in Great Britain than it is in the U.S.: the marginality 
coefficient is statistically significant in three out of four 
instances. The model best predicts whether the Member handles or 
refers local government cases and whether the Member holds more than 
two surgeries a month. The signs of the coefficients indicate that 
those in close seats, the recently elected and the Labour Members are 
more likely to undertake these activities. The model also seems to 
predict publicity of casework reasonably well although the party sign 
is the opposite of what was expected (indicating that Conservatives 
are more likely than Labourites to publicize their casework 
activities). This brings to mind a complaint we heard from several 
MPs who thought that they were not able to publicize successful 
casework as much as they would have liked to because the local press 
was unsympathetic to them. Perhaps, the attitude of the press to the 
Member is the crucial factor here. 
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[ INSEB.T TABLE VII HERE] 
In general, the constituency activities of British MPs appear to be 
systematically related to various factors.5 Most importantly, the 
electoral incentive is as ev ident in the British data as it is in the 
U.S. data. The fact that the models of casework activities fit the 
British data slightly better than the U.S. data is consistent with our 
earlier finding that the model applies to t�e Congressional resource 
allocation decisions more than to the casework activities of 
Congressional staff: that is, since MPs must deal with casework 
without the aid of large staffs, their practice& will reflect their 
interest& and circumstances more directly than the practices of 
Congressional staffs will reflect those of Congressmen. 
Aside from the variables in the basic model, we also attempted 
to test two alternative explanations of casework. One is whether MPs 
do casework because they derive intrinsic satisfaction from doing so. 
A number of MPs indicated that they thought casework important because 
it helped them to keep in touch with their constituents, or that it 
was the only way they found they could be effective in Parliament, or 
that it enabled them to see how legislation passed by Parliament 
affected citizens, or simply that it gave them personal satisfaction 
to help a citizen with a problem. Any mention of these nonelectoral 
reasons was coded into a dummy variable which was then included in the 
estimation. To our surprise, this variable did not prove to be 
statistically related to any of the dependent variables. 
Another plausible hypothesis is that Members undertake high 
levels of constituency service in order to please their local party 
TABLE VII 
DETERMINANTS OF CASEWORK ACTIVITIES -- (UK) 
Solicits Publicizes Handles Local 
Cases Successful Cases Cases 
Margin in 
1974 -.012 -.026* -.019* 
( .011) (.013) ( .010) 
Party -.68* .18 -.10 
(.28) (.32) (.24) 
Yr. elected .01 .021* .OS* 
(.01) ( .012) (.01) 
Constant .19 -.62 -1. 71* 
( .91) (.95) (1.04) 
Chi squared 8 8 18 
(3 d.f.) (3 d.f.) (3 d.f.) 
R2 .13 .15 .25 
n 100 76 100 
Procedure; 
Prob it 
* p < • 05 (Z-test)
Frequency 
of Surgeries-
-.02* 
(.01) 
-:-.66* 
(.30) 
.03 
(.02) 
-1.86 
(1.52) 
11 
(3 d.f.) 
.23 
94 
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activists. Two attempts were made to measure this variable: one was 
to use a question which asked whether the Member thought that 
constituency work contributed to the morale of the local party, and 
the other, a question about whether the Member had been asked by the 
adoption c0111111ittee to live in the constituency. The assumption behind 
the second measure was that demands of this sort would reveal activist 
interest in the Member's constituency role. ,However, neither measure 
proved to be statistically significant when entered into the equation. 
We would caution the reader against drawing a firm conclusion from 
these results. Obviously, the phenomena of intrinsic benefits and 
party pressures are very difficult to measure, and we are not 
completely satisfied with the measures we had at hand. The question 
of the importance of such factors remains open, though our analyses 
suggest that intrinsic benefit and party pressure are not the 
principal determinants of service activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Constituency service consumes significant amounts of the 
representative's time and resources in both Great Britain and the 
u.s.. MPs and Congressmen handle large amounts of casework and look 
after their constituency's interests in various ways. Differences in 
staff matter, but not exactly in the way one might think. The average 
MP must devote more of his or her own time to constituent affairs than 
the average Congressman, and consequently the opportunity costs are 
higher for MPs. Variations in constituency work in both countries 
seem to follow systematic patterns. In particular, marginality, party 
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and the year elected are variously related to casework activities and 
staff resource allocations. Surprisingly, the relationship between 
these variables and casework activities is somewhat larger in Great 
Britain than in the U.S., and we have suggested that this is because 
these activities are not mediated by large staffs in the U.K. 
The key point, however, is that despite important cultural and 
historical differences, the existence of single member simple 
plurality rules in both countries creates a similar incentive for 
Congressmen and MPs; namely, the need to establish personal support in 
their constituency. To be sure, the strength of national party ties 
and various institutional differences will limit the impact of these 
efforts on electoral outcomes: the absence of strong commitees and 
pork barrel opportunities in Great Britain is a good example of this 
point. However, credit claiming by casework is an opportunity 
available to all representatives in advanced industrial states because 
of the growth of the welfare state and the inevitable tensions which 
arise between citizens and bureaucrats. Ombudsman work has certain 
desirable invariant features which make it politically attractive: it 
is noncontroversial, generally appreciated and helps create a positive 
image in the home district. It is not surprising therefore that this 
role is so important for both MPs and Congressmen. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  Some might contend that the MP has nothing better t o  do with his 
or her time than casework. From the perspective of the Members 
we interviewed, this is not true. Many MPs indicated to us that 
constituency work competed for time wi�h such things as being 
with their families on the weekends, committee meetings, 
participation in debate and the administrative chores of being in 
the government or the shadow cabinet. The distinction between 
the objective and subjective value of time should not be ignored, 
2. The CPS 1978 Congressional study sampled in 108 districts. We 
were able to secure interviews with staff in 1 02 out of the 1 08 
districts. There is an obvious asymmetry between interviewing 
the staff in the U.S. case and the MP in the British case which 
must be considered when making comparisons across these two data 
sets, 
3. The Gallup study samples 133 districts. During 1978 and 1979, we 
interviewed 146 MPs and agents, including some MPs and agents in 
the same constituencies and some in constituencies not sampled by
Gallup. In this paper, we have excluded agent interviews in 
constituencies where we had interviewed the MPs, interviews with 
the newly elected and interviews with those outside the original 
Gallup sample. This gives us 100 observations: 68 MPs and 32 
agents. 
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4. The categorical nature of our dependent variables violates the 
assumptions of standard regression analysis. Specifically,
heteroskedasticity results in biased estimates of the standard 
errors of the estimted coefficients. Various alternatives are 
available. The one chosen in this work is an n-chotomous probit
procedure developed by McKelvey and Zanoina (1975). It is a 
generalization of ordinary probit based on the assumption that 
the dependent variable has at least ordinal characteristics. The
procedure produces maximum likelihood paprameter estimates as
well as estimates of thresholds on the (unobserved) continuous
dependent variable. Those thresholds are assumed to determine
the correspondence between the observed discrete categories and a 
range of values on the underlying unobserved variable. 
Hypothesis testing is straightforward, but the goodness of fit
measures are less so. In the tables we report i2, an analogue to 
the familiar R2 of standard regression analysis. The former is 
intended as an estimate of the latter, and is obtained by 
substituting the observed categorical values for the unobserved 
values and using an estimate of the residual sum of squares. The 
sampling distribution of i2 is unknown. For further information 
see Richard McKelvey and William Zavoina, "A Statistical Model 
for the Analysis of Ordinal Level Dependent Variables," Journal 
of Mathematical Sociology 4 (1975: 1 03-120.
5. We had thought earlier that a control for the perception that 
casework mattered might be important. Further testing indicated
that this control was not important. 
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